~~SECRET~~

NFAC 2296-80

27 March 1980

Memorandum for [redacted] 25X1

Subject: Thoughts on Long Range Planning

Attached are some thoughts on the subject that might be of interest to our LRPWG and might be the basis for future discussions. The paper is admittedly incomplete and not completely consistent. It also involves some unstated assumptions that may not be valid. Nevertheless, I offer it as a first-cut, tentative effort for what its worth might be to the LRPWG.

[redacted] 25X1

Attachment:
As stated

[redacted] 25X1

DERIVED BY SIGNER
DECLASSIFY ON XX 27 Mar 1986
DERIVED FROM

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] 25X1

SRP
27 March 1980

Thoughts on Long Range Planning in CIA

I. Background

- EXCOM tasked NFAC with the lead role in Agency long range planning in mid-1979.

- EXCOM in November 1979 approved (1) moving towards a more flexible long range collection strategy to attack the numerous and diverse intelligence problems that will confront the Agency in the future, as distinguished from the narrower, less cost-effective Pilot Collection Program; and (2) an NFAC approach which would develop an intelligence-driven, long range problem set and a mechanism/process for attacking them, later calling on DDO and DDS&T to participate after sufficient progress had been achieved.

- NFAC established its Long Range Planning Working Group (LRPWG) in January 1980. The group, which includes a representative from each Office, has met several times a month. Discussions have mostly centered around how to approach truly long range intelligence planning, ways to improve the present planning system, and candidate long range intelligence problems.

II. Where the LRPWG Stands

- Apparently the idea of attempting to forecast an overall futuristic framework, "The World in 1990", has been rejected as being infeasible and too subject to unforeseen developments. On the other hand, solid think pieces like [redacted] "A Technological Look at the 1980s" (29 February 1980), [redacted] "Thoughts on World Situation 5-10 Years Hence With Repect to Weapons Systems Capabilities and Prospects" (5 February 1980), and others which the LRPWG has seen, are basically useful in visualizing long range intelligence problems that are truly different from today's and that will compel changes, at least in Agency thinking, if not in more direct and tangible matters. From such beginnings, should not the LRPWG be able to develop what has been described as "a realistic intelligence future derived from data provided by NFAC Offices and presented in a manner conducive to R&D and resource planning"? 25X1 25X1

[redacted]

CLASSIFIED BY SIGNER
☐ DECLASSIFY ON XX 27 Mar 1986 25X1
DERIVED FROM

SECRET

- The LRPWG apparently is committed, as a first step, to developing a list of candidate long range problems for D/NFAC and EXCOM by late March, or early April 1980.

- The LRPWG has not yet discussed to any extent the mechanism or process by which the Agency will develop "doable" long range plans on a systematic, scheduled cycle and where appropriate, the specific policies, projects and programs to implement those plans. Presumably, this will be addressed by the group in later phases.

- Nor has the LRPWG addressed in any specific way the broader question of extending long range planning to the whole Intelligence Community and improving Community prospects for dealing effectively with whatever the future brings. Presumably this rather fundamental aspect will also be dealt with later.

III. Some Random Ideas

A. A Macro Approach to Long Range Personnel Recruitment for the Agency

- Taking long term trends (1985-95 time frame) into account, deduce what regions of the world can be expected to become relatively more important to the US in geo-political terms (political-economic-military; people; industrial output, etc) than at present. For example, these regions of increasing importance might be the Western Hemisphere (Canada to Brazil; the Caribbean); Japan and the Western Pacific Basin; and Africa South of the Sahara. Regions such as the USSR-E. Europe; the ME-Horn of Africa-SW Asia-NW Indian Ocean; and China would probably remain relatively as important as now. Other areas, such as NATO Europe, might decline in relative importance to the US. Then translate these conclusions into gradual changes in the future composition of the analytical family in terms of area/country background, language qualifications, and the like.

- List the major long term trends in S&T and implications for intelligence coverage such as those appearing in [redacted] paper (Examples: Quality of Soviet military technology, acquisition and production; foreign technologies and S&T policies; international S&T negotiations; nuclear proliferation at more advanced stages of development.) Translate these requirements into the phased increase over time of the new kinds of analysts required. Do the same thing for the DDO family. STAT

- Similarly, develop a list of the political economists/ financial experts with regional/country background, needed to deal with overall economic matters, as well as major global resource problems in such areas as food, energy and the like. Translate these requirements into the new personnel acquisitions needed over time by the NFAC and DDO families.

- Integrate the above requirements into an overall personnel recruitment plan for the Agency. (The above would no doubt require a special study group. There are risks involved in such an approach, but no more severe than attempting a micro approach to the problem, or waiting for the gaps in expertise to appear and falling behind the power curve.)

25X1

C. NFAC Organization

The time may be approaching to undertake a study on the longer term, optimum organization for NFAC. Organizational objectives might be, for example, to:

- Provide a better integrated approach to analysis, yet preserving some level of single discipline effort. (Is this feasible?)

- Provide a better capability to handle multiple crises on a sustained basis, as well as facilitate transition to a full national emergency situation.

- Allow proper attention to be devoted to current intelligence without emasculating research and estimative work.

- Provide an improved capability to support US diplomatic efforts with respect to and monitor international negotiations on S&T matters and international resource agreements.

- Provide an enhanced capability to monitor world-wide energy matters and the flow world-wide of key global commodities such as food, energy, materials and arms.

- Foster better Community relations and an enhanced overall Community performance.

(The above might be assigned to a special study group composed primarily of retired senior Agency officials.)

IV. Candidates for Highest Priority Long Range Intelligence Problems

- I have initially selected 12--they are not necessarily in any rank order of priority. Moreover, I seem to have mixed some oranges with apples.

- They are:

1 Long term implications for the United States of a decline in the cohesion and strength of the NATO Alliance.

2 Soviet penetration (political-economic-military) of the Third World (1985-95); Soviet objectives, capabilities and limitations, intentions and prospects by region; long term implications for the United States.

3 Long term implications of an indefinite period of slow economic growth, world-wide, for the US and advanced Western nations; the USSR and East Europe; China; developing nations--OPEC, Brazil, RoK, etc; and LDCs.

4 Intelligence collection in support of crisis monitoring.

[redacted] 25X1

6 Long term security and intelligence implications of advances in communications technology.

7 Long term inevitability of nuclear proliferation; implications; need for new approaches to international cooperation and controls.

8 Long term impact of quantitative growth and qualitative improvements in Soviet ground forces and tactical air and naval systems on the East-West military balance; need to expand and improve US collection and analytical capabilities and efforts in this field.

9 Long range study to establish areas/countries, world-wide, of relatively unchanging importance to the US (1985-95); develop projected minimum overseas base structure (to include base rights, overflight rights, etc.) needed for US power projection in defense of US interests; and estimate prospects for achieving such a structure.

10 Long range forecast of extent and nature of arms trade and technology transfer world-wide; implications for the US.

11 Long term study to develop the storage, manipulation and display system for the very large volumes of data needed in 1985-95, but beyond the planned capabilities of SAFE.

12 Long term study to develop the collection and analytical systems for 1985-95 to provide intelligence on foreign technologies and S&T policies, as well as foreign national economic and industrial planning, needed by the US to remain competitive in foreign trade.